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Law, economics, and torture
By James Boyd White
The following essay, which appears here with the permission of the University of
Michigan Press, is the text of a talk given by Professor White at a conference held at
the Law School last year, entitled “Law and Democracy in the Empire of Force.” (An
interview with White in which he discussed the conference appeared in the Spring
2007 issue of Law Quadrangle Notes on pages 27-28.) In more complete form the
essay will appear in a book of conference proceedings, edited by Professor White
and Professor Jefferson Powell of Duke Law School, to be published by the University
of Michigan Press in early 2009. The participants at the conference were invited to
speak about their own sense of the ways in which law and democracy have been
changing in recent decades and what these changes mean.
The phrase “empire of force” comes from a famous essay by Simone Weil on the
Iliad, where she uses it to refer not only to brute force of familiar kinds, then and now,
but more importantly to all the ways in which the habits of thought and expression at
work in our culture tend to trivialize other people and deny their full humanity.

In our invitation to you as speakers at this conference, Jeff
Powell and I encouraged you to talk about the state of law and
democracy in whatever way seemed to you best, whether or not
it happened to comport with usual styles of academic thought and
expression. Today I plan to take advantage of our own invitation,
and speak a little differently from the way I usually do, about what
I take our culture of law and politics to be like at the moment.
What I say will necessarily be impressionistic and personal, and
of course I do not ask you to accept any of it on my say-so. Take
these reflections rather as a question, which is how far your own
experience, your own thinking, is like or unlike my own.

I. Making the rich richer
As I think about the ways in which things are changing under
our feet, a series of phenomena come to my mind. Maybe they
are connected, maybe not. That is one of my questions.
The first of these is the response—or more properly nonresponse—of the public and the media to the remarkable transfer
of national wealth to the very rich which has taken place in our
lives. I grew up under Eisenhower, when there was a 90 percent
tax on incomes over $100,000 ($1 million in our terms), and a
general sense that our country was committed to fundamental
equality. This was perhaps in part the result of World War II, of
which people at every economic level bore the cost, even unto
death. It was clear to almost everyone that we were somehow all
in this together.
The transfer of wealth to a class of super-rich began modestly
under Kennedy and has taken off in the past decade. It is I think
a deliberate goal of the present administration, but its roots are
much deeper in our world than that. What concerns me is that in
recent years, aside from a few harmless op ed pieces, and a few
more substantial articles in progressive journals, there has been
little real concern about this transfer of wealth, certainly not
the mass outrage one might have expected. I include law school
faculties and students among those unconcerned.
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A. My question is this: Why has this transfer not been instantly
and unanimously resisted by the enormous majority of people at
whose expense the rich are multiplying their wealth—a majority
of whom are not doing well economically, some of whom are
doing very badly?
This is a matter of mass psychology, and of course I am no
expert, but I sense here a feeling of helplessness in the face of
overwhelming force. I think that the concentration of wealth
is not in the eyes of most people a good thing; they feel rather
that nothing can be done about it, and that, in a world like this,
one had better simply look to his or her own welfare, not large
questions of law and democracy.
It seems that the rules of the game have somehow shifted over
the past 20 years or so: one is not to expect equality, or fairness,
or compassion, from our society or its government; one is not
to expect decent social and medical services, or clean air, or a
mature response to the immense problems of global warming;
one is not to expect lawyers and judges to talk in an earnest and
serious way about what justice requires. These things are not
going to happen, so don’t waste your energy complaining. It is a
kind of learned helplessness.
Obviously I cannot wholly explain this shift, but one factor
seems to me to lie in the way we have come to talk about the
nature and purpose of our country, and of human life itself,
which is largely in economic terms. For the society as a whole
the dominant motive is assumed to be the powerful but empty
desire for wealth, without regard to what good or evil that wealth
might do; for the individual, felicity is defined largely in terms
of consumption. The “American Dream” is no longer a dream of
escape from totalitarian rule and lawless government, as it once
was, but a dream of expansive, seemingly unlimited, getting
what you want. Of course this way of talking has no place for a
language of democratic government—for that requires action,
judgment, participation, not mere consumption.

This way of imagining life not only creates an empty and
trivializing image of human experience, it hides the crucial truth
that what the consuming economy in fact creates is not just more
opportunity for consumption but power, power in the form of
wealth. And great wealth gives great power. As the government
withdraws from the regulation of the economy, as it has been
doing for decades now, its place is taken by private individuals or
private organizations which have immense power over the lives of
all of us.
The rhetoric supporting this movement speaks of government as the enemy, and the market as freedom for us all. But the
power that is created by the disparity of wealth is real power and,
unlike governmental power, it is not shaped or guided by law and
democracy. Corporate owners and managers are not elected by
the people, not subject to the constitution, not supposed—or
even allowed—to be motivated by any ideal other than the
acquisition of wealth and power, and usually not responsive to
argument or complaint.
This arrangement is implicitly—and sometimes explicitly—defended by the argument that this power is subject to the
control of the people, not through government, but through what
is called the discipline of the market, which, the argument runs, is
both more efficient and fairer than regulation through law. Those
who argue for “getting the government off our backs” are mainly
arguing for removing power from law and democracy and transferring it to a regime that has no democratic values or authority.
But the market cannot be a substitute for democratic government: It has no place or role for any of the institutions through
which government works, or for the kind of public deliberation,
thought, and argument by which those institutions live; it works
not by the principle of one person one vote, but the very different
principle of one dollar one vote; and it simultaneously generates
and obscures immense imbalances in wealth and power. The
market contains no check on the drive to unlimited economic
expansion, a drive that is proving to be suicidal, threatening the
planet upon which everything we are and do depends.
The consumer dream of our culture teaches us that we have
no responsibility, no capacity for action, no right to demand
meaning in our work and lives, and no obligation for the welfare
of others. It induces the sense of learned helplessness I referred
to earlier—which is exactly the opposite of the kind of vigorous
independence and competence upon which democracy depends.
B. One particularly strong feature of the culture of consumption is an immense and relentless campaign, so pervasive and so
normalized as to have become invisible, to persuade the public
to accept and act on its premises. I refer here to the world of
consumer advertising, especially to its apotheosis in television.
This kind of advertising persuades people not only to buy this or

that item, but more importantly, to accept and live by the whole
infantile dream of the consumer economy. It is only in a narrow
sense that advertisements compete with each other; in a deeper
way they reinforce one another constantly.
Even more disturbingly, this kind of advertising has a direct
analogue in the way in which national politics proceeds, for it has
become accepted that a political campaign is run like an advertising campaign—though a better word for this cultural form,
given its connection with state power, would be propaganda.
Both propaganda and advertising are marked by the desire
to manipulate others through the use of slogans and clichés
and images, sound bites and buzzwords. As they become widespread—active and present in our minds and speech—both
forms of speech tend to destroy the capacity for independent
thought and expression upon which self-government depends.
One characteristic of both forms is that nothing is meant,
everything is said for the moment, all on the assumption that
the people who make up the audience have no memory and no
capacity for critical thought. A world is created where thought is
not possible. In neither domain—the consumer economy or the
world of politics and government—are we defined as responsible
participants in a world of shared life and action. Rather, we are
manipulated objects of an empire.
C. So here is my rather glum conclusion. My intuition is that
the reason we do not rebel at the immense and unfair transfer of
wealth, and all that is associated with it—from golden parachutes
for failed CEOs to $60 million bonuses for successful investment
bankers—is that in some sense we do not believe that we really
have democracy at all any more, at least in the sense in which
we once thought we did. Democracy and its law are based on a
vision of fundamental equality among human beings, and neither
can survive in a world in which equality is systematically denied
by such disparities of wealth and power. Under these conditions
the best we can have is a series of contests among the powerful
resolved by plebiscites.
I believe we have become to a large degree the subjects of
an oligarchy, an internal empire. By empire here I do not mean
merely the cultural forces, strong as they are, that make up what
Simone Weil calls an “empire of force,” but an actual political
reality in which unelected people rule much of our lives. Their
object is to extract as much economic value as possible from
the earth and the oceans and the air, and from the labor—and
unemployment—of billions of people.
This empire has co-opted many of us—perhaps all of us in this
room—who might be its critics, because we to a large degree
benefit, though in a relatively small way, by the same policies that
enrich the super-rich. We eat at expensive restaurants, and take
trips to Europe, and buy expensive suits. So do the reporters
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for the Washington Post and the NewYork Times. There is in our
world almost no voice for the poor, which is perhaps a third of
our nation. The NewYork Times does of course take positions of
concern for the poor on its editorial pages. But its sections on
“Arts and Leisure” and “Style,” let alone “Travel & Escapes,” and
the advertising in its Sunday magazine, all with one voice affirm
the value of wealth and consumption and the world of radical
inequality they create.
D. Having painted this distressing picture, I want to affirm
that in my experience there is a remarkable force of another and
opposed kind in American life—not much seen in the media or
in the world of national politics—which I would call a natural
readiness for self-government. We see it in local politics all the
time, in elections for the school board say, and in homeowner
associations and other private groups. This is the world where
we know how to create an organization—with president, vice
president, treasurer, secretary—which is subject to bylaws and a
statement of purpose, and whose meetings follow Robert’s Rules
of Order. We know how to live in the space it defines: how to hold
meetings and reach decisions and live with them even when we
disagree; how to define our common values and purposes and try
to live by them.
But this capacity for self-government—perhaps our greatest
national treasure—is simply not much visible either in the ways I
see the nation described in the media nor in the ways politicians
and officials talk about it nor in the way I see the national government functioning. Congress, for example, does not seem to work
as I describe the school board working, in a real way, with real
debates, and real decisions: All too often it seems to be only an
image or phantasm of itself, a pretense of government, in which
almost nothing is ever said that anyone means. What one hears
is almost always calculated and shaped, as a piece of advertising
is shaped, by asking what will work with the audience one is
simultaneously flattering and manipulating. This is sometimes
even true of judicial opinions.

II. The abandonment of law
My second phenomenon—perhaps you perceive it too—is
the experience of reading certain Supreme Court opinions which
seem evidently written by clerks and not much rewritten by the
justices. There are exceptions, but too many opinions seem to
speak in no one’s voice, without seriousness, without a sense of
responsibility for what is done or said, as though deciding the case
and explaining the decision were empty exercises.
A. Such opinions do not seem to me in any way to reflect, as
I was taught an opinion should, a deep struggle to determine the
meaning of the relevant legal authorities—and in the process to
find one’s own mind growing and learning—but rather express
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a largely unexamined judgment one way or the other as to the
result of the case, often based on rather crude previous commitments of a political kind, which are not tested in the crucible
of thought and argument. This kind of formulaic jurisprudence
does not expose the true reasons and thinking of the Court, and
subject it to criticism; and it does not produce texts that can be
read with the kind of care and attention we are used to giving
texts in the law.
For a comparison, let me suggest you look through a volume
of Supreme Court reports from 40 or 50 years ago. The difference is striking: Here we have distinctive voices, distinctive
minds working seriously, responding to each other, trying to
say the truth as they see it. Of course they are subject to frailty,
as we all are, but at their best they are engaged in a process of
self-education, and the education of the public as well. Just to list
the names, when I was in law school—like Black, Frankfurter,
Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, and White—
was to invoke a different world.
I also see a turning away from the law in law schools themselves, which have in some ways become closer to “think tanks” or
public policy institutes than the schools of professional training I
once knew. In casebooks the cases are often reduced to paradigms
meant to facilitate argument about theory, rather than seen, as
they occur in practice, as complex challenges to the mind, in
which law interacts with facts, facts with law, different laws with
different laws, and all these things with our developing sense
of justice. Rather, the main interest seems to be in questions of
policy and theory abstracted from the life of the lawyer or judge.
I was taught that the central legal questions, for lawyer and
judge alike, are these: What texts should count as authoritative,
and why? What do they mean, and why? What weight should be
given to the judgment a text reflects, and why? How in the light
of all these things, and in the context of the present, should the
case be decided? Of course lawyers will disagree on the merits
of all these questions, but they will agree in affirming a world in
which power is distributed, regulated, reviewed.
The tendency I mean is manifest perhaps particularly in what
is called “law and economics,” but not only there. It runs through
the ways in which scholarship is evaluated and it shows up in our
almost total silence about law teaching. When I went into law
teaching it was with great doubt about whether I would ever
write anything, but with great confidence that the teaching of law
was itself an activity—an art with a meaning—that could occupy
a mind and justify a life. I wonder if anyone thinks that today.
A system of policy and critique of the kind that is at work in
our law schools may make useful discoveries, but such a system
cannot perform the functions of law itself. Neither economics
nor sociology nor psychology nor any other field can address, let
alone resolve, the distinctive legal questions about the identity

and meaning of authoritative texts and about the degree of
deference due the judgments of others. Taking economics as
my example—though the same point could be made about any
other field—I would say: One cannot do law in the language of
economics, or economics in the language of the law. To try to
do either would be as ludicrous as trying to do science in the
language of religion, or religion in the language of science.
B. My sense of what has been happening is well exemplified in a brief passage by Judge Richard A. Posner. Here Posner
is writing in favor of what he calls “pragmatism,” meaning the
decision of legal cases by a judicial balancing of costs and benefits.
The only reason for attending to prior legal texts, in his view, is
that to disregard them would have social costs, and these costs
should be taken into account by the person with power.
“The point is not that the judge has some kind of moral or even
political duty to abide by constitutional or statutory text, or by
precedent; that would be formalism. It is merely that continuity
and restraint in the judicial function are important social goods,
and any judge proposing to innovate must consider not only the
benefits of the innovation but also the costs in injury to those
goods.” [In “Pragmatism versus Purposivism in First Amendment
Analysis,” 54 Stanford Law Review 737, 739 (2002)]
To me this misunderstands the nature of both law and
democracy, including the obligation—moral, political, and
legal—to respect the authority of legal texts and the fundamental
principle of separation of powers. In the world called into being
by this passage law would lose its essential meaning.
C. I have a sense, then, that law itself is being eroded and

transformed, just as I said earlier democracy is being eroded
and transformed, and in both cases in the service of what I have
called the empire. This fact has a tragic quality, for me, because
the law by its nature should be a strong force of resistance to the
principles of empire, a strong force of defense for democracy.
For the law is built at its foundations upon the principle of
separation of powers, not their merger into a single force. In this
it is the opposite of empire. In our law every institutional actor
must acknowledge and respect judgments made by others: The
legislature must respect the judgments expressed in the constitution, the courts the judgments of the legislature, lower courts the
judgment of higher courts, and so on. This means that the lawyer
never addresses a person who has all the power. Both lawyer and
judge constantly turn to other texts, composed by other persons,
who have made judgments on the questions in the case which
they are bound to respect.
It is crucial that the texts that our law invokes as authoritative,
and to which the judges and lawyers pay respect or deference, all
rest in some way upon the authority of democratic institutions.
They are statutes passed by elected legislatures, or opinions

issued by judges appointed by elected governors, or contracts
written by the parties themselves, and so on. In affirming the
value and validity of its own processes the law is thus always
affirming democracy.
The law is not a closed system, operating behind locked
doors, but is connected in hundreds of ways to our democratic
culture. To disregard this structure of authority, and to replace it
with a theory—whether philosophical, political, or economic in
kind—is to erode our democracy at the root. For in the world of
theory the rightness of the result depends upon its congruence
with the theory in question, which has no basis in democratic
authority, but rests solely upon the commitments of those who
are persuaded by it: the community of believers.
At the simplest level, what the law teaches is that we live in
a world in which different people can have different, decent,
and reasonable views; that we need a way to respect these views
and judge among them fairly, that is, openly and honestly; that
the world constructed by the law is one that distributes power
differentially to various public and private agents—so that even if
we lose this case, or this issue, we have a residue of autonomy and
freedom; and that all this being true we cannot fairly and rightly
decide disputes by reference to theory, or our own estimate of
costs and benefits, or to the sorts of clichés and buzzwords and
slogans that characterize much political talk. The law, at its best,
improves our thought and our language. What has been happening
to law, however, is that it is becoming an instrument of empire,
and in the process losing its essential character.

III. Torture
My third phenomenon is the public response—or once more,
the nonresponse—to the recent efforts of the Administration to
legalize what any sensible person would call torture—certainly if
he or she were subjected to it—and the related effort to remove
from all protections of the law a class of human beings selected
by officials as “enemy combatants.” Of course there are honorable
exceptions in the bar and in the public world, but there has not
been what there should have been, a universal public outcry of
a sort that would have driven the beast of torture off the field of
our shared life.
This has haunted me more than anything else. Not so much
because American soldiers have on occasion beaten, abused,
tortured, and killed people they have captured. Those are terrible
things, but war always includes them, just as it includes the
incineration of little children, the rape of women, the purposive
destruction of life itself. What is new here are the efforts to make
torture part of the approved business of government, claiming for
it the authority of law, and to establish the existence of a class of
persons under the control of the government who are completely
beyond any protection of law.
LQN SUMMER 2008
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To connect this image with what I said about the state of legal
thinking, I think we hear an all too familiar voice in the famous
“torture memorandum” composed by Jay Bybee, now a federal
judge: It is written in mechanical and conclusory terms, as though
a routine legal analysis of a rather empty kind could simply be
used without thought and without question to justify human
torture. It troubles me to think, as I do, that this is a voice for
which we who teach in law schools may be especially responsible.
A. Part of the reason for our supine lack of response is our
habituation to the sort of advertising and propaganda I have
mentioned, for which the fears generated by the events of 9/11,
and unceasingly stimulated since, provide strong nourishment.
According to this thin and inadequate form of thinking, there is
an ineradicable line between “us”—the good people of America,
under unjustified and aggressive threat—and “them,” those
others, whose torture or “severe interrogation” is in question.
Why should we care about what happens to them? They are the
enemy, or at least irredeemably “other.”
But of course they are not these things in fact: They are fellow
human beings, some of them citizens of our country; they are
selected for torture or abuse not by some foolproof process that
will identify without error the “bad,” whoever they are, but by
who knows whom, acting on who knows what information, and
with who knows what motives, with all this happening behind a
deliberate screen of secrecy.
The central principle of democratic government is official
responsibility, and here that is entirely erased. No one stands
up as the one who has made the crucial decisions; no one in the
public even knows that most of them have been made.
The fate of Guantanamo prisoners who were returned to their
own countries is instructive: Almost all of them were released
after investigation by their home governments, it turning out that
many of them had been seized without any justification at all by
persons seeking a bounty offered for the identification of “terrorists.” Only a handful were tried in their home countries and at the
time of writing none of those had been convicted of any crime.
Even if someone is in fact an “enemy,” that of course does not
justify his torture. Maybe he has to be killed, if he is shooting at
you, but when captured he should be treated humanely and with
dignity, as we hope our soldiers will be treated when they are
captured.
B. It is sometimes argued that torture is justified by the need
for “information.” This argument works by another specious form
of thought, which, when added to the first, seeks to establish a
sense of necessity that will remove torture from the moral sphere
almost completely. The form of thought I mean is captured in this
question, repeated endlessly in the media, and even in classrooms: “If you knew that there was an atom bomb somewhere
102
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downtown with a timer ticking wouldn’t you torture the people
who know about it to make them tell you where it was, or how
to disarm it?”
The question seems to pose a serious problem of moral
thought, but, like many such hypotheticals, it is not real.You
can never “know” there is an atom bomb, or a timer ticking;
and you can never “know” that you have one of the “people who
know about it.” The facts assumed by the hypothetical never
exist in any individual case. And even if there were one such case
that would do nothing to justify the hundreds or thousands or
tens of thousands of cases in which we have engaged in torture.
The question about the ticking bomb invites us to live in a false
world—the world ultimately of advertising and propaganda—
not the real world.
The unreal hypothetical is used not to support the proposition that it might possibly support, namely that in a wildly rare
and dramatic case one would use torture, but something very
different, namely that torture itself should be evaluated simply by
weighing the costs and benefits of the practice. The logic of cost
benefit analysis is epitomized in the ticking bomb case, but it runs
far more widely and deeply in our culture than that hypothetical.
All of the practices of abuse and inhumanity rest upon the same
ground, that “national security” or the “safety of the nation”
require it.
C. Despite its claims to a high degree of rationality, the kind
of cost-benefit analysis that is so often offered as an alternative to
legal thought in fact tends not to the rational but to the irrational.
For who is to quantify the danger that terrorism presents?
The incantation of the phrase “national security” is offered as a
universal acid that will erase everything except the fear that it
stimulates. This talk about overwhelming necessity fails to address
the obvious question—obvious to a lawyer, that is: Who shall
determine whether such a necessity exists? Under what procedures and standards? Subject to what review? These are the core
questions of legal thought, and they are by this logic erased. For
to take those questions seriously would be to invoke the whole
apparatus of law as we know it. This cannot be allowed to happen,
if one agrees that the importance of national security—as defined
by whom?—is of infinite importance, because it would limit the
power of the government to “protect us.”
It cannot be allowed for another reason, I think, namely that
torture cannot in the end be legalized: It cannot bear the light of
day, but must go on behind locked doors in unmarked buildings,
in mysterious and unknown places reached by darkened airplanes,
and carried out by anonymous interrogators and their anonymous
assistants. The cost benefit analysis must not include, because it
cannot do so, the reality of the torture itself, the evil it does to
the tortured and to the torturers alike.

The corrosive effect of “cost-benefit analysis” here is even
worse than I have said. The question presented by the ticking
bomb case is whether the “known” existence of the ticking bomb
justified torture. But of course such a bomb may exist but be
unsuspected by us; if so it presents exactly the same real-world
danger as if it were known; does that not justify the use of what
is euphemistically called “extreme measures” to find out? Anyone
may know something that is of comparable value, perhaps
without even knowing how important it is. The true need for
information is just as great in those cases as in the ticking bomb
case itself. To think in terms of a single value that trumps all
others, here “national security,” is a form not of rationality but
irrationality, ultimately a kind of insanity.
The logic at work here leads to universal spying, universal
wiretapping, universal torture, limited only by whatever costs
are perceived by the perpetrator—or, more accurately, by the
superior officer who in the comfort of his or her own office
orders the perpetrator to torture or turns a blind eye to what
he should know is happening. And this line of thinking not only
justifies torture, it would justify anything. It erases not only
protective legal rules, but the inherent protections of legal
thought itself.
Once you start on a process of interest balancing in which one
of the items is of potentially infinite value you have committed
yourself to an impossible world of paranoia, not law—a world
like the world of human slavery—in which one value cancels
all others, in which appetite, as Shakespeare says, becomes a
universal wolf and at last eats up itself.
D. The spring from which I think all these evils flow, including
our incapacity to resist them, is the fact that at some level we
know that we in this country are running an empire—an external
one as well as the internal one I described earlier. And we know,
I think rightly, that it is not possible to run an empire on the
assumptions and aspirations of democracy under law. The very
idea and existence of the empire depends upon a line between
“us” and “them”—we, the rulers who have the power, and they,
including our own citizens, the ruled who are subject to it. In the
eyes of the empire the ordinary people of this country have no

different status from foreign nationals: All are subject to the same
imperial regime. Our nation is on its way to becoming a thirdworld country both economically and politically.
The empire cannot work on democratic principles that
recognize the equal humanity and value of all people, or under a
legal regime that has the same law for all. And its deep injustice,
which opposes it to the principles of law and democracy alike,
makes it fundamentally irrational. It becomes a single value
system devoted to the perpetuation of its own power. Everything
must be sacrificed to its own continuing existence.
I am reminded here of Thucydides’ account of another
empire, that of Athens, in his History of the PeloponnesianWar—
which is to my mind the first and best account of international
law, seen not as the command of some supranational sovereign,
but as the product of convention and agreement among the
relevant states. Thucydides shows us how this system of law
works in a real way, without any sovereign power; how it can
be destroyed by a state that has amassed so much power that it
believes it can disregard the law, and all questions of justice; and
how this destruction leads eventually to the destruction of the
superpower in question—which without law and justice cannot
think rationally or sensibly about its own character, its own
interest, even its own ambitions.
As Thucydides tells the story it is a true tragedy, for Athens
has no real alternative. The international legal system of that day
presumed equality of the states, which the power of Athens itself
destroyed. For us, however, there is a solution, for in the intervening centuries humanity has invented the rule of law—equality
under law, equality as an achievement of law. Instead of claiming
immunity to law, the strong in our world should make every
effort to reaffirm their allegiance to law, and to the fundamental
equality that law and democracy together assert. For it is ultimately upon law and justice—both among nations and within our
nation—that our strength, our very identity, depends. n
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